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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
McKAY DEE HOSPITAL, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
Case No. 16182 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and TED CLARK SPACKMAN, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendants ag~ee with statement of Plaintiff on •oisposition 
of the Case before the Industrial Commission. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek an affirmance of the Order of the Industrial 
Commission. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Statement of Facts in the Brief of the Plaintiff McKay 
Dee Hospital is incorrect in the following: 
1. The defendant hit a low ceiling with his cast one month 
after the original cast was applied and not •about two weeks.• 
2. The pin came out at time of removing the cast and not 
because of hitting cast on ceiling. 
3. Infection in the bone developed during the time 
origin<Jl c:<~e>t was on and not after the ceiling incident. 
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POINT I. 
EMPLOYEE'S INJURY WAS NOT PURPOSELY 
SELF-INFLICTED. 
Section 35-1-45 reads: 
Every employee mentioned in section 35-1-43 
who is injured, and the dependents of every such 
employee who is killed, by accident arising out 
of or in the course of his employment, whereso-
every such injury occurred, provided the same was 
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be entitled 
to receive, and shall be paid, such compensation 
for loss sustained on account of such injury or 
death, and such amount for medical, nurse and 
hospital services and medicines, and, in case of 
death, such amount of funeral expenses, as is 
herein provined. (emphasis added) • 
The statute is clear on its face that compensation shall be 
paid unless the injury was purposely self-inflicted. Spackman 
did things that n.any would consider foolish, childish or negligent. 1 
But this type of behavior does not cause denial under the workmen's 
compensation law of Utah. The statute prohibits compensation only 
when the employ<'" purposely self-inflicts injury upon himself. .. 
such as in a suicin. or setting fire to one's gas soiled clothing. 
The employc·e went to the office of his supervisor during 
"break" (R-25) to inquire about his work schedule. Both purties 
felt they were ri.illl in their opinions (R-1) but words were spoke.~ 
in disagreement over~ the work schedule and the employee left in 
anger. He hit some boxPs and garbage cans (R-27) on his way out 
and then hit a na·1 <~l door with his fists. The knuckle of his 
-2-
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little finger on his right hand hit the edge or lip of ~ 
locked door. (R-28 and 29) and a bone in the little fiDge~ ... 
broken. 
To deny compensation the statute madates that the iAjazy ._ 
"purposely self-inflected." The act of the employee ia lai~t:!Dw 
the door with his fist was an intentional and purpoaefal eot. aat 
it certainly does not follow in anyway from the facta of thi8 aa.e 
that the employee purposely or otherwise intended to injure b~ 
self. The act was intended but not the injury. 
The definition of "purposely" is that the act be •with a 
deliberate or expressed purpose, intentionally. Webster'• SaYaAth 
New Collegiate Dictionary. 
The act may have been negligent. • .but negligeace doee aot 
destroy the right to compensation under the law of worka8n'a ~ 
pensation. Twin Peaks Co. v. Ind. Com. 57 Ut. 589. 
There is a vast difference between the purposful self-in-
fliction of an injury such as in a suicide or in deliberately aet-
ting oneself on fire when clothing is saturated with gasoline 
Carland v. Vance, 137 Pa. Super 47, 10 A.2d 114 (1939) and in being 
injured doincJ a foolish or negligent act, Buhler v. Maddison, 109 
Utah 245, or even a prohibited act or injury caused in play or 
pranks. Twin Peaks Co. v. Ind. Com. 
We agree that our Utah statute 35-1-45 supra provides for 
a defense where the injury is purposely self-inflicted, but that 
is not the I del ui!l ': i luation in this case. 'l'his case is certainly 
distingui~:hablc fro"' Henry v. Schenk Mechanical Contractors, Inc. 
-qG tH::2 61 r, _ In t h-1r case the "board" found that the employee 
-3-
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intentionally inflicted injury upon himself. In the present 
case the Commission found that applicant's injury was not there-
sult of a self inflicted injury. 
Utah cases are in complete conformity in holding that where 
the employee is within the cause of his employment it is immaterial 
whether he was guilty of negligence or wilful misconduct. M&K CotE_. 
v. Ind. Com. 112 Ut. 488, 189 P.2 132. Larson's Workmen's 
Compensation Section 30.00 and 30.10 on Misconduct of Employee 
states: 
S30. GENEHJ\L IRRELEVANCE OF EMPLOYEE FAULT 
§30.00 Misconduct of the employee, whether 
negligent or wi 1 ful, i~ i;·,material in compensa-
tion law, unless it tak<·s the form of deviation 
from the course of employment, or unless it is 
of a kind specific.,Jly Jlade a defense in the 
jurisdictions cont.1 initH; such a defense in their 
statutes. 
§30.10 Statutory h~ckground of employee fault 
rules 
Although it is frpnuently observed that 
"negligence is i rrelc·!.lJ,t" in compensation law, 
this statement is apt to l.>c misleading because 
it is too narrow. The correct statement is that 
employee fault of any ch.-lrctcter is irrelevant, 
with a few exception,; to be noted presently. 
Misconduct of ttl(' c;;·r>loy,·P, whether negligent or 
wilful, is immat<·ri,d not because it is affirma-
tively stated to Lc so in th(' statutes (although 
a few contain surh lanq'"'"''), but because the 
basic test of cove1 CJ<;e is relation of the injury 
to the eMploy~··"~, v:i th n" r0fcrcnce to the per-
sonal merits of th,,• l·-<rti<'"· The Compensation 
Act m<~rks out a c-1 rclP lvho,;p boundaries are fixed 
by the narisin'· nu~ of" ,t!11..l •• in thl' course> of" 
Pmploy::>ent cone·· • 1-.'i.:!l.Jl that circle there is 
compensation. CJ•.:: :i:!c· t); I<' is not. ~~o~t acts 
arC' si::>ply si l :1: ,,. t 11r· nt i r·e question of 
g<'nPr,ll fault ,.,.,.. There is Lhf're-
for<' no occ.h" '"' :, , '''"'l -:h bet~o.·t·<'n nl"Jl i-
g<'nt f.:~ul t ,,,,: ·_. , :. i Ill'<' f o111l L 
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itself can have no bearing on the process of 
drawing the boundaries of compensability. 
The effect of a given act of misconduct 
by an employee must be judged against a back-
ground of three different kinds of statutes: 
(1) the commonest kind of statute, in which 
there are no affirmative defenses based on 
misconduct (except perhaps self-injury (Utab) 
and intoxication); (2) statutes making wilful 
misconduct a defense; and (3) statutes makin9 
particular kinds of misconduct, such as wilful 
failure to use safety devices or violation of 
law, either a complete defense or a ground for 
reduction of the amount of the award. ~us, 
the act of deliberately removing safety goggles 
in violation of regulations may give rise to the 
contention that this takes the employee out of 
the course of employment in the absence of any 
affirmative defense in the statute, or the con-
tention that this act is a clear example of the 
specific defense of wilful failure to use a 
safety device. 
And Larsen goes on to say in section 36.60 that tbe defense 
of intentional self injury, not apart from suicide, has produced 
no law of significance. (R-52). That section continues: The 
only cases ... etc. (R-52). 
Surely plaintiff'f> attempt to place employee's neglgent act 
of hitting a door in anger as the same as a purposeful self in-
flicted injury is another of these"fictions" which has had no 
acceptance and is out of place in the construction of compensation 
acts. 
POINT II. 
EMPLOYEE'S ACCIDENT AND INJURY AROSE OUT 
OF OR IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
"\vork connection" is the basic concept of compensation cover-
a,!C. Larson's l.:t'-j ~-1-l_orkru~n' s Compensation, section 6. 20. Forty-two 
Sf,th·s usc the pi~:,,--, "7\ri•:ing out of and in the course of employ-
·:,L." liLllt if: th•· •ntly siCJLc according to Larson which uses the 
-5- cr1 
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the more broad language of "Arising out of or in the course of 
employment.• Spackman was injured in an accident in the course 
of his employment. an argument arising out of a work schedu~. 
Plaintiff cites Sullivan v. Ind. Com., 79 Ut. 317, 10 P.2 91: 
and Calif. Casualty Indem. Exch. v. Ind. Ace. Comm. 21 Cal. 2d 
461, 132 P.2d BlS. Neither case is rclevent. The Utah case 
involve• an employee who was injured while returning his daughter ' 
to her school apartment. The California case cites a ruling that 
has no application to Utah law or cases. 
Ted Spackman was injured on company property (McKay Dee 
Hospital) a few feet from the office of his supervisor, after a 
dispute on the employee 1 s work schedule. And the l~orkmen 1 f", Com-
pensation Act should be libc' illy applied in favor of cover aye. 
Askrt~n v. Ind. Com~, 15 U.2 275, 391 P.2 302. 
Cases cited by Plaint iff hospital as supporting po~;:i tion 
that thcrP was no ".tcc-id, nl" 'n fact supports position there was 
an accident. Thi· court 11 '" continually held "that for the' 
purpose of the Act, it (an·i dent) should be given a bro<Hi meaning. 
Carling v. Industri~l Con~mi''sio~, 16 U. 2d 260, and Graybar _r~ 
POl :·JT I I I . 
Till·: PERIO!l 01' TE:!P0'\!1~1 TC)TAL DISABILITY 
I-lAO, l'i:SlJI.'i' 01 ;,cCillENT OF APHIL 5, 197fl. 
Plaintiff'!; H1 tcf, 1'·'·.1• lO, states thilt employe(· cauc;<'cl 
additionill init11·y t 'hi, 1 in ;··r· 1,·:'"" he hit thC' cilst on the ceil-
1· l:t t l1 aft(' r t lt<' (, r 1 ~J i 11.11 
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accident. On that date the doctor related that he va• •CCncaZr•• 
about infection" and prescribed an antibiotic. 'l'he doctor Oil 
that date also noted "there seems to be possibly sa.e ly•la of 
the bone." (R-2 & 3). 
It therefore appears that osteomyelitis had already •tazte~ 
as of May 5, when the cast was replaced because of the iDoideD~ 
of hitting cast on the ceiling of his room. 'l'his inciden~ llkel7 
allowed the treating of the infection faster and more successful 
than if the incident of May 5th had not occurred. 
The doctor also "very strongly admonished him to avo14 all 
trauma to the hand." 
The record contains no information that would substantiate 
a shorter period of temporary total disability. 
SUMMARY 
The Order of the Industrial Commission granting an awar4 
will not be disturbed if there is any substantial competent 
evidence to support it. The Record complelely supports the 
Order. 
Dated this ~day of March, 1979. 
~~-:::2~ 
-7-
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
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